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Marine Bank v. Weaver: New Guidance
On What Is Not A Security
By M. Thomas Arnold

INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court recently
ecided Marine Bank v Weaver,' involving the
efinition of a "security" for purposes of §10 (b) of
ie Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2 While the
pinion is reasonably brief,3 the case may aid
kwyers in determining whether a particular transction involves a security. 4
This article includes a discussion of the definion of the term "security" in various securities
iws, the Howey test, two prior Supreme Court
ecisions, and the Marine Bank case, which is
ummarized and commented upQn. The signif:ance of Marine Bank lies in its focus on the
inguage preceding and overriding the statutory
efinition of a "security" if "the context otherwise
equires." The case puts some meat on the bones
f this skeletal language.

I. THE SIMILARITY OF THE
STATUTORY DEFINITIONS OF
"SECURITY"
The definitions of "security" found in the
ecurities Act of 1933- and the Securities Exchange
Lct of 19346 are very similar. Thus, any inter-

retation of the term under the Securities Exhange Act of 1934 carries substantial weight in
iterpreting the term for Securities Act of 1933
urposes, and vice versa. 7 In addition, the definions of "security" under these two federal laws
re similar to the definition found in the Uniform
ecurities Act. 8 This is not coincidental."
'he Oklahoma Bar Journal

In sum, "[wihile there are some differences, the
basic definition of a security under the Securities
Act, the Exchange Act, and state blue sky laws is
the same."' 0

II. THE HOWEY TEST
The term "security" has long been accorded a
broad interpretation under both federal and state
securities laws. In particular, the catch-all phrase
"investment contract," found in the definition of
securities under all these laws, has been utilized to
fulfill the remedial purposes of the acts. The
Supreme Court has stated that
the reach of the [Securities Act] does not stop
with the obvious and commonplace. Novel,
uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever
they appear to be, are also reached if it be
proved as matter of fact that they were widely
offered or dealt in under terms or courses of
dealing which established their character in
commerce as 'investment contracts,' or as 'any
interest or instrument commonly known as a
"security." 'n
In the landmark Supreme Court case of S.E.C.
v. W. J. Howey Co. 1 2 the now famous Howey test
was born. The test, according to the Court, "is
whether the scheme involves an investment of
money in a common enterprise with profits to
3
come solely from the efforts of others."1
State courts, as well as federal courts, have
looked to the Howey test in determining whether a
particular interest constituted a security.1 4 Along
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the way, several questions of interpretation have
arisen. For example, the Howey test speaks of profits coming solely from the efforts of others. Read
literally, this test would exclude an interest in any
venture in which the investor's efforts contributed-such as a franchise. Recognizing this, a
number of decisions have held that "solely" does
not really mean "solely." The best known decision
in this respect is S. E. C, v Glenn W. Turner Enterprises,' where the Ninth Circuit held that "the
word 'solely' should not be read as a strict or
literal limitation on the definition of an investment
contract."16 The Court realized that if the requirement were read in a mechanical fashion, "tilt
would be easy to evade by adding a requirement
that the buyer contribute a modicum of effort."17
The Court felt that the remedial aims of the
securities laws could be best served by adopting a
"more realistic test, whether the efforts made by
those other than the investor are the undeniably
significant ones, those essential managerial efforts
which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.""8
Another question of interpretation has involved
the meaning of the "common enterprise" requirement. Some courts have interpreted commonality
to require the existence of multiple investors and a
pro rata sharing of profits.1 Other courts have rejected the need for this horizontal commonality. 20
Instead, these courts have viewed the common
enterprise requirement as meaning nothing more
than the intertwining of the fortunes of the investor with the efforts and successes of either
those seeking the investment (the promoter) or of
third parties (other investors). 2 ' This approach accepts either horizontal or vertical commonality as
sufficient. Obviously, this approach is more inclusive than the first.
Thus, the Howey test has provided a basic
framework for the determination of whether a
transaction involves a security. Questions of its
interpretation have arisen which have generally
been resolved through analysis of the purposes of
the securities laws.

III. RECENT SUPREME COURT CASES
FINDING NO SECURITY
In recent years, the Supreme Court has considered several cases involving the issue of what is
2200

a security. In United Housing Foundation, Inc. v
Forman," the Court decided that shares of stock
entitling a purchaser of the shares to lease an
apartment in a non-profit housing cooperative
were not securities. The shares of stock were nontransferable and could descend only to a surviving
spouse. The Court rejected the notion that the
purchased interest must be considered a "security"
because it was represented by "stock" and because
the statutory definition includes the word
"stock."23 The Court stated that "[bjecause
securities transactions are economic in character
Congress intended the application of these statutes
to turn on the economic realities underlying a
transaction, and not on the name appended
thereto."14 The Court pointed out that the shares
involved had none of the characteristics commonly associated with a security in the commercial world.25
The Court also rejected the idea that a share of
stock in the cooperative constituted an "investment contract." The Court stated that "there can
be no doubt that investors were attracted solely by
the prospect of acquiring a place to live, and not
by financial returns on their investments."2 6
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v
DanielPl the Supreme Court decided that a compulsory, noncontributory pension plan did not
constitute a "security" under the federal securities
laws. The Court stated that the test of whether a
financial relationship constitutes an "investment
contract" is the Howey test.28 The Court continued, however, saying that "[tihis test is to be
applied in light of 'the substance-the economic
realities of the transaction- rather than the names
that may have been employed by the parties.' "29
Applying the Howey test to the facts of the case,
the Court held, first, that there was no investment
of money30 and, second, that there was no expectation of profits from a common enterprise.3 1 The
Court rejected the plaintiff-employee's argument
that he had invested in the pension fund by allowing part of his compensation to be paid into it. The
Court held that "the purported investment [was] a
relatively insignificant part of an employee's total
and indivisible compensation package"32 and that
the "decision to accept and retain covered employment must have only an attenuated relationship, if
any, to perceived investment possibilities of a
future pension. "33
Vol. 53-No. 34

The Court also found that the eligibility of an
employee for a pension under the plan in question
depended primarily on the employee's efforts to
meet the vesting requirements.3 4 Thus, any "profit" expected by an employee would be one based
primarily on his or her own efforts rather than on
the managerial efforts of the trustee.3 5
After proceeding through the Howey type
analysis, the Court turned, in Part IV of the opinion," to an additional consideration. In this part
f the opinion, the Court noted the passage of the
Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 and
liscussed briefly the thrust of this legislation. It
:hen stated:
The existence of this comprehensive legislation governing the use and terms of employee
pension plans severely undercuts all
arguments for extending the Securities Acts to
noncontributory, compulsory pension plans.
Congress believed that it was filling a
regulatory void when it enacted ERISA ....
Not only is the extension of the Securities Acts
by the court below unsupported by the language and history of these Acts, but in light of
ERISA it serves no general purpose.3 7

rhis theme, introduced as something of an after:hought, was to reappear in the Marine Bank
pinion.

IV. MARINE BANK V. WEAVER:
A BRIEF SUMMARY
Marine Bank v. Weaver" involved a couple
wvho purchased a $50,000 certificate of deposit
rom a bank. They then pledged the certificate,
which was partially insured by the Federal Deposit
nsurance Corporation, to the same bank to
;uarantee a $65,000 loan by the bank to a third
)arty. The quid pro quo for the loan guarantee
vas an agreement between the owners of the cerificate and the third parties whereby the cerificate owners were to receive 50 per cent of the
iet profits of the third parties' business and $100.
>er month for the duration of the guarantee. In
iddition, the certificate owners were given the
ight to veto future borrowing by the business,
ind were given the use, at the discretion of the.
hird parties, of a barn and pasture owned by the
>usiness.3
'he Oklahoma Bar Journal

The business eventually went bankrupt, and the
bank indicated its intent to claim the pledged certificate of deposit. The certificate owners
thereupon sued the bank alleging, inter alia, a
violation of Securities Exchange Act §10 (b). They
alleged that the bank officers had represented that
the proceeds of the loan they were guaranteeing
would be used by the business as working capital.
Instead, the money was allegedly used in large
part to repay prior bank loans and cover an overdrawn checking account. Additionally, it was
alleged that the bank officers were aware of but
did not disclose the business' poor financial condition.4 0
The District Court entered summary judgment
for the bank on the §10 (b) claim on the basis that
"if a wrong occurred it did not take place 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,'
as required for liability under §10 (b)." 4 ' The
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that either the
certificate of deposit or the contract between the
certificate owners and the third parties could
reasonably be found by a fact finder to be a security.42
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. While recognizing that the definition of
"security" under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 is broad and that the term has been interpreted in an expansive manner, the Court stated:
The broad statutory definition is preceded,
however, by the statement that the terms
mentioned are not to be considered securities
if 'the context otherwise requires

. .

Moreover, we are satisfied that Congress, in
enacting securities laws, did not intend to provide a broad federal remedy for all fraud.43
The Court held, first, that the certificate of
deposit was not a security. According to the
Court, bank certificates of deposit are significantly different from other long-term debt obligations. The certificate of deposit in question "was
issued by a federally regulated bank which is subject to the comprehensive set of regulations
governing the bank industry."" The Court went
on to note that "deposits [in federally regulated
banks] are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Since its formation in 1933,
nearly all depositors in failing banks insured by
FDIC have received payment in full, even payment for the portions of their deposits above the
2201
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amount insured."4 These considerations led the
Court to conclude:
The definition of security in the 1934 Act provides that an instrument which seems to fall
within the broad sweep of the Act is not to be
considered a security if the context otherwise
requires. It is unnecessary to subject issuers of
bank certificates of deposit to liability under
the antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws since the holders of bank certificates of deposit are abundantly protected
under the federal banking laws. We therefore
hold that the certificate of deposit [involved]
is not a security."'
The Court also held that the agreement between
the certificate holders and the third parties was not
a security. It felt that the agreement was "not the
type of instrument that comes to mind when the
term security is used . . . . . According to the
Court:
The unusual instruments found to constitute
securities in prior cases involved offers to a
number of potential investors, not a private
transaction as in this case. In Howey, for example, 42 persons purchased interests in a
citrus grove during a four-month period. In C.
M. JoinerLeasing, offers to sell oil leases were
sent to over 1,000 prospects. In C. M. Joiner
Leasing, we noted that a security is an instrument in which there is 'common trading.' The
instruments involved in C. M. Joiner Leasing
and Howey had equivalent values to most
persons and could have been publically traded.48
2202

By comparison, the certificate of deposit owners
and the third parties had negotiated one-on-one a
unique agreement "not designed to be traded
publically."49

The Court's holding in Marine Bank v Weaver,

however, was expressly limited by the Court to
the facts of the case. The final footnote to the
opinion stated:
It does not follow a certificate of deposit or
business agreement between transacting parties invariably falls outside the definition of a
security as defined by the federal statutes.
Each transaction must be analyzed and
evaluated on the basis of the content of the instruments in question, the purposes intended
to be served, and the factual setting as a
whole.50

V. MARINE BANK V. WEAVER:
SOME COMMENTS
The decision in Marine Bank v Weaver is in-

teresting in several respects. First, while the Court
mentioned the Howey case, it abstained from a
Howey type analysis as to the certificate of
deposit's status. Instead, it focused primarily on
the perceived lack of need for application of the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
What makes this intriguing is that a number of
past lower federal court and state court decisions
can perhaps be best explained as attempts to use
the securities laws to fashion remedies where other
remedies may have been inadequate or
unavailable."
Vol. 53-No. 34

Marine Bank can be viewed as the negative image of these cases. It denied application of the
securities laws because other federal remedies and
safeguards were deemed adequate. The Court's
approach is reminiscent of Part IV of the Daniel
opinion, which the Court discussed in a footnote
to Marine Bank v Weaver." In Daniel, however,
the Court spoke of the lack of need for application
of the federal securities laws only after applying
the Howey test to the facts of the case.
Second, the Court indicated that the scope of
the federal securities laws is limited to those frauds
involving instruments having "equivalent values
to all persons"53 and the ability to be "traded
publically."54 The phraseology "equivalent
values" seems to connote some readily ascertainable value which would facilitate trading of
the interest.
Accordingly, the Court refused to apply the
federal securities laws to a "unique agreement,
negotiated one-on-one by the parties."" Thus,
while the Court reaffirmed the applicability of the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws
to "uncommon and irregular instruments,"" it
seems willing to leave parties to unusual,
negotiated transactions to their remedies, if any,
under other laws.

CONCLUSION
The Marine Bank case will undoubtedly be
useful to attorneys in assessing potential remedies
for a foregone set of facts, as well as in evaluating
and structuring contemplated transactions. It provides some feeling for those contexts which may
be viewed by the Supreme Court as inappropriate
for application of the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws. These would likely include
transactions which are closely and more directly
regulated by other provisions of federal law and
unique, privately-negotiated agreements, interests
in which are not amenable to public trading.
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ATTENTION RUNNERS

Second Annual Run Sponsored By Young Lawyers Division Of The Oklahoma Bar Association
The Young Lawyers Division of the Oklahoma Bar Association announces the 1982 OBA-YLD 5-Mile Run in Oklahoma
City on Saturday, October 2, 1982. All members of the Oklahoma Bar Association are eligible to enter.
- Overholser Road at Lake Overholser, Oklahoma City
COURSE
- October 2, 1982 at 9:30 a.m.
TIME
- Pavilion Parking Lot and Picnic Area which is located on East Overholser Drive between N.W. 10th and
PLACE
16th Streets (East side of Lake) immediately south and east of the dam
- All members of the OBA, law students and law graduates awaiting bar examination results
ELIGIBILITY
- Each participant will receive a T-shirt acknowledging his or her participation. Trophies will be awarded
AWARDS
to the first three finishers in the following categories:
MEN: (29 and Under) (30 -39) (40 -49) (50 and over) WOMEN: (35 and Under) (36 and Over)
SPLIT TIMES
- Split times will be provided
- Entry form below, together with $5.00 must be received prior to September 30, 1982 by David CummENTRY
ings, P.O. Box 470, Ponca City, Oklahoma 74602. Questions concerning the race should be directed to
Mr. Cummings at (405) 762-2403.

1982 OBA-YLD 5-MILE RUN ENTRY FORM
NAMF

PHONE

BIRTH DATE

ZIP
T-SHIRT SIZE (Circle) S M L
I hereby represent to the Oklahoma Bar Association - Young Lawyers Division (OBA-YLD) that I will be in good health and proper physical
condition to run the 5-mile race. In consideration of the acceptance of my entry, I hereby, for myself, my heirs and personal representatives,
waive, release and forever discharge any and all rights and claims which I may have or which may hereafter accrue to me against the OBA-YLD,
ADDRESS

its officers and directors, and the City of Oklahoma City, its officers or agents, for any and all injuries or damages which may be suffered by me

in connection with my entry in or participation in the 1982 OBA-YLD 5-Mile Run.
Signature

Date

(Mail to David Cummings, P.O. Box 470, Ponca City, OK 74602 (405) 762-2403)
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